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DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS
I. INTRODUCTION

Three-quarters of a century ago, Judge Learned Hand observed that "the
issue of fair use ...is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright."'
Although the Supreme Court handed down influential decisions regarding the
fair use defense to copyright infringement, 2 and though the United States Code
sets forth four fair use balancing factors, 3 questions about the proper scope of
the fair use defense remain. 4 Seventy-three years after Judge Learned Hand's
telling remark, the "issue of fair use" 5 and its application continue to plague the
legal system.
In June 2012, the United States District Court for the Central District of
California controversially held that a pro-life organization's tendentious and
disturbingly graphic use of a family planning clinic's counseling video was a
protected parody under the fair use exception to copyright infringement. 6 In
Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Centerfor Bio-EthicalReform, the defendant
spliced images of aborted fetuses and abortion procedures throughout the
original counseling video as a way to support a diametrically opposite
viewpoint. 7 After determining that the character of the video was parodic, the
court applied the remaining fair use factors to conclude that the new video was
protected as fair use.8
Part II of this Note will begin with a discussion of the constitutional
background of copyright law and the statutory development of the fair use
defense to copyright infringement. Part II will then discuss the protections
given to parodies as a form of criticism and comment under the umbrella of fair
use by focusing on the influence and application of the Supreme Court's

I Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).

2 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574-95 (1994) (applying the fourfactor fair use test of 17 U.S.C. § 107 to a parody of the 1964 song Ob Pretty Woman, by Roy
Orbison and William Dees).
3 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (setting forth the four fair use factors, which include: "(1) the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.").
4 See, e.g.,
Pamela Samuelson, Is Copyight Reform Posible?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 740 (2013)
(reviewing JASON MAZZONE, COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

(2011)) (discussing "copyfraud" and fair use).
5 Delar,104 F.2d at 662.
6

Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 868 F. Supp. 2d 962,

972, 982-93 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
7 Id.
at 967.
8 Id.
at 970-82.
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decision in Campbell v.Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.9 Finally, Part II will discuss parodies
and the fair use defense as applied to diametrically opposing viewpoints, such as
the viewpoints presented in the Northlanddecision.
Part III of this Note begins by criticizing the Court's liberal labeling of
potentially infringing works as criticism. Part III will then discuss instances in
which courts, specifically the Northland court, correctly construed diametrically
opposing viewpoints as criticism under the first fair use factor. Next, this Note
will address the problems presented when opposing viewpoints are categorized
as parodies, eliminating a need for humor in the parody analysis. Finally, this
Note concurs with the outcome of Northland under a different analytical
approach.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF COPYRIGHT LAW

The United States Constitution confers upon Congress the power to grant
"authors and inventors the exclusive right to their... nritings and discoveries"
for a limited time. 10 Accordingly, Congress extends copyright protection to
original works of authorship in any tangible medium, including internet videos
as audiovisual works." A copyright vests in the author at the moment the work
12
is created and fixed in a tangible form.
If copyright protects an author's creation, she possesses the exclusive right
to reproduce and copy the original work, to prepare derivative works based
upon the original work, and to sell, rent, lease, or lend the copyrighted work to
the public. 13 These rights of exclusivity provide an economic incentive for
authors to create and disseminate their expressive works. 14 The limited
monopoly also promotes public access to creative works that would likely not
5
exist without copyright protection.'

9 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8 (emphasis added).
1 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(1) (2012) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression... from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device ... includ[mg] . .. motion pictures and other audiovisual works ...
12 Id. § 102; see also id. § 101 (defining when "[a] work is 'created' ").
13 See id. § 106 (enumerating the exclusive rights associated with a copyright).
14 See LYDIA PALLAS LOREN & JOSEPH ScoTT MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES
& MATERIALS 342 (Vet. 3.0 2012) (discussing the utilitarian theory behind copyright protection).
15 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001).
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To ensure an effective limited monopoly system, copyright owners may
protect their exclusive rights through infringement actions. 16 For an author
with a protected copyright interest to claim copyright infringement, he or she
must show both ownership of a valid and registered copyright and that the
7
alleged infringer actually copied original parts of the author's expression.
B. THE FAIR USE DEFENSE TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

An alleged infringer of an author's copyright can seek recourse from
accusations of infringement by claiming the fair use defense set forth in 17
U.S.C. § 107.18 This provision provides an exception to infringement when the
work is used "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching,... scholarship, or research."' 9 To determine whether the fair use
defense can save an otherwise infringing use, courts consider the following four
factors: (1) the purpose and character of the infringing use; (2) "the nature of
the copyrighted work"; (3) "the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the work as a whole"; and (4) the degree to which the infringing
work affects the market value of the copyrighted material. 20 Traditionally,
courts considered this defense to be a privilege vesting for a person, separate
from the owner of the copyright, to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable
2
fashion without the copyright owner's consent. '
C. PARODY AS FAIR USE

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines parody as "a literary or musical
work in which the style of an author or work is closely imitated for comic effect
or in ridicule."
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has held that parody is a
genre of work that can invoke the fair use exception to copyright
infringement. 23 The Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. opinion, an influential fair
use decision rendered by the Supreme Court, thoroughly discussed the

17 U.S.C. 5 411 (2012).
17 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
18 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
16

19 Id.
20 Id.
21 See Harper & Row, Publ'rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (discussing the
historical development of fair use).
22 Parody Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.meriam-webste
r.com/dictionary/parody (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
23 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) ("[P]arody, like other
comment or criticism, may claim fair use under § 107.").
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application of parody as fair use. 24 In Campbell, the Court recognized that,
similar to "less ostensibly humorous forms of criticism," parody provides a
social benefit by casting new light upon the copyrighted work and creating a
new work in the process of parodying.25 The Court further emphasized that
"the heart of" true parody lies in the potentially infringing author's use of
26
segments of the copyrighted work to comment on that original work.
In Campbell, the controversy surrounded the song, Oh, Pretty Woman, written
by Roy Orbison and William Dees 2 7 Over twenty years after the debut of the
song, 2 Live Crew, a then-popular rap group, changed the original song to
include crude lyrics 28 as a way to produce a humorous rap version of Orbison
and Dees's work.29 The Court applied the four-factor framework set forth in
17 U.S.C. § 10730 to determine whether 2 Live Crew's use of the song was
eligible for a fair use defense as parody.
1. The Pupose and Characterof the Use. The Court analyzed the initial prong
set forth in § 107(1) regarding "the purpose and character" of the infringing
use, including any commercial nature, 31 by asking whether the new work was
transformative of the original creation. 32 While a transformative nature is not
mandatory for a finding of fair use, the remaining factors become less
consequential when a potentially infringing work adds new and transformative
33
content.
In Campbell, the Court explicitly stated that under copyright law, "the heart
of any parodist's claim to quote from existing material[] is the use of some
elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least in

24 Id. at 579-94.
25 Id. at 579.
26 Id. at 580.

27 Id. at 571-72. The rights to Orbison and Dee's song, Oh, Prett Woman, were subsequently
assigned to Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. Id at 572.
28 For example, the new lyrical selections by 2 Live Crew included the following changes to the
lines of the song: "[Big hairy woman] You need to shave that stuff..."; "[Big hairy woman] All
that hair, it ain't legi-i-it/['Cause you look like Cousin I-I-I-I-It] ...";"[Two-tisnin' woman] You
was out with my boy last night/ [Two-timin' woman] That takes a load off my mind/ [Two timin'
woman] Now I know the baby ain't mine .... " 2 LIvE CREw, Prety Woman, on As CLEAN AS
THEY WANNA BE (Luke Records 1989); see also Campbell,510 U.S. at 595 app. B.

29 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572.
30 Id. at 576-94.
31Id. at 578-85 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988 ed. & Supp. IV)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

32 Id. at 579 ('The central purpose ...isto see.., whether the new work merely 'supersede[s]
the objects' of the original creation.., or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with a new expression, meaning or message .. " (quoting
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 3 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841 (No. 4,901)))).
33 Id.
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part, comments on that author's works." 34 However, the defendant's claim of
fair use fades if the alleged infringer's commentary lacks components of
criticism and is instead used for attention-grabbing purposes or to avoid
creating an original work.35 The Court reasoned that it should not presume
parody is unquestionably fair,36 asserting that parody must be fully analyzed
37
under the microscope of all four fair use factors.
The Court further stated that whether the parody was in good taste or bad
taste was irrelevant to the fair use analysis. 38 Instead, a fair use parody defense
39
may be raised so long as the "parodic character may reasonably be perceived."
Tipping the balance further in favor of the defendants on the first fair use
factor, the Court held that the lewd lyrics of 2 Live Crew's work "could
reasonably be perceived as" commenting on or criticizing the original by
4
contrasting the innocent nature of the 1964 song with the "street life" of 1989. 0
The Court reasoned that the "reference and ridicule" included in a parody
distinguishes parodies from conventional forms of transformative comment
and criticism.

41

Having determined that 2 Live Crew's use was a parody, the Court then
addressed the commercial nature of the new work.42 Rejecting the lower court's
presumption against extending fair use protection to commercial works, the
Court reasoned that a commercial purpose, which they found to be the purpose
in this case, is merely one element to consider in the analysis of the first
factor. 43 However, they recognized that a commercial use often weighs against
a finding of fair use. 44
2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work. The second factor of the fair use
balancing test, "the nature of the copyrighted work," 45 was not thoroughly
addressed by the Court in Campbefi6 because the factor was not essential to the
analysis. The original copyrighted musical creation was a well-known, fanciful,
and valuable expressive work. 47 Such works undoubtedly fall within the "core

34 Id. at 580.
35
36

Id.
Id. at 581.

37 Id.
38 Id. at 582.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 583.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 583-85.
43 Id.

44Id. at 585 (quoting Harper & Row, Publ'rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)).
45 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006).

46 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
47 Id.
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of intended copyright protection," thus making it more difficult to establish fair
use of the highly valuable work. 48 However, parodies almost always copy
famous works, making this factor the least helpful in separating parody from
49
infringement.
3. Amount and Substanialioy. The third fair use factor turns upon "the
amount and substantiality of the portion [of the copyrighted material] used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole."5 0 To apply this factor, courts
should conduct a quantitative and qualitative review of the amount of the
copyrighted materials used.5' The Campbell Court acknowledged that the use of
a substantial portion of the copyrighted work could negatively affect any
transformative nature and could increase the market harm to the original.5 2 If a
new work consists primarily of the original work, the new work is more likely a
"merely superseding use" acting as a substitute.5 3 In contrast, parodies tend to
receive different treatment under the third factor.5 4
In Campbell, the Court held that a parody must copy at least enough of the
original to make the criticism and comment recognizable by the audience. 55
The Court reasoned that 2 Live Crew's use of the original song was necessary to
conjure up the original and to communicate the intended message.5 6 In this
instance, the use was not excessive because 2 Live Crew's creation consisted of
its own lyrics and sounds, and the new song was not "a verbatim 'copying' of
the original."5 7 The Court weighed in favor of the defendants because the
lyrical parody was substantial despite any copying.SS
4. Effect on the Market for the Original Finally, the Court considered the
fourth fair use factor, "the effect of the use upon the potential market for the
copyrighted work,"5 9 rejecting a presumption of future harm to the market for
the copyrighted material. 60 The fact that 2 Live Crew's work was for

48

Id

49 Id.
5 See WILiAm F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:141 (2013) (discussing the qualitative and

quantitative analysis of amount and substantiality).
5' Robinson v. Random House, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 830, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting 17 U.S.C.
§ 107(3) (1988 ed. & Supp. 18)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587-88.
53 Id.

54Id at 588.
55 Id.
56 Id.at 588-89 ("If 2 Live Crew had copied a significantly less memorable part of the original,

it is difficult to see how its parodic character would have come through.").

57Id.
at 589.
58 Id.

5917 U.S.C. § 107(4).
60 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-91.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol21/iss1/5

8

Flegal: Diametrically Opposing Viewpoints: Why Polar Opposites Should Not

2013]

DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSING VIE WPOINTS

6
commercial gain was insufficient for a finding of market harm to the original. 1
When a potentially infringing use has a lesser effect on the copyright owner's
expectation of financial gain from his or her limited monopoly, a lesser showing
of public benefit is needed to justify the allegedly infringing use. 62 The Court
63
opined that a parody typically serves a different market than the original work.
The Court differentiated between criticism that suppresses demand for the
work, such as a negative review, and copyright infringement, which "usurps"
64
demand by acting as a market substitute for the original.
As explained in Campbell,the market harm for an original work includes the
harm to the market for derivative works in addition to the harm caused to the
original work itself.65 The lower court considered whether the defendant's use
adversely affected the market for the original work, but the parties did not
66
present evidence regarding the effects on the potential rap-derivative market.
Consequently, the Supreme Court in Campbell remanded the case for
67
determination on the fourth factor.

D. FAIR USE AND PARODY AFTER CAMPBELL

In light of the Campbelldecision, the 5 107 fair use defense has been applied
in a myriad of cases to determine whether a potentially infringing use is indeed a
parody.68 For example, the court in SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. relied
upon Campbell to hold that a derivative work was a parody. 69 In SunTrust, the
book Gone With the Wind by Margaret Mitchell70 was allegedly infringed by The

Id.
62 MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 2000).
63 Id. at 591.
61

64 Id. at 591-92 (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
65 Id. at 590.
66 Id. at 593.
67 Remanded because the presumption of unfairness was in error in addressing the first and

fourth fair use factors. Also, the Court remanded to determine whether the copying was, in fact,
excessive. Id. at 594.
68 See L. David McBride, Note, Copyright: Same Song, Different Verse: Parody as Fair Use After
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 48 OKLA. L. REv. 627 (1995) (analyzing the application of
fair use parody exception after the Supreme Court handed down its Campbell decision); see also
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (examining the fair use defense under the Campbell
framework).
69 See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2001)
(holding that an independently authored sequel to Gone With the Wind was a parody under the fair
use defense).
70 SunTrust was the trustee of the Mitchell Trust, which held the Gone with the Wind copyright.
Id. at 1259.
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Wind Done Gone, by Alice Randall. 71 The determinative question with regard to
Randall's fair use defense claim was "to what extent a critic may use a work to
communicate her criticism of the work without infringing the copyright in that
work." 72 To answer this question, the SunTrust court appealed to the purposes
underlying the Copyright Clause to the Constitution. 73 The Copyright Clause's
relationship to the First Amendment emphasizes that the free flow of criticism
and commentary are among the most important policy considerations for a
74
finding of fair use.
The SunTrust court addressed the "somewhat vague" definition of parody in
Campbell.75 This vagueness stemmed from Justice Souter's initial assertion in
Campbell that a parody is intended for "comic effect or ridicule" 76 and his
subsequent references to parody as a comment upon an original work. 77
However, given the Campbell court's warning against judging the quality of a
parody, the Eleventh Circuit chose to apply the broader view suggested by
Justice Souter. 78 The SunTrust court thus refrained from explicitly requiring
humorous character to establish parody. 79
Under this broad view, the court readily concluded that the allegedly
infringing novel possessed a parodic element, as the author sought to comment
upon and criticize Mitchell's depiction of slavery and the Civil War South
portrayed in Gone With the Wind.80 Upon determining that the work possessed
the requisite parodic character to raise a fair use defense through parody,81 the
court analyzed and balanced the four fair use factors set forth in 5 107 in light
82
of Campbel.
The first factor balanced in favor of fair use because the work's highly
transformative nature outweighed its underlying commercial purpose. 83 As in
Campbell,the court brushed aside the second factor noting that the nature of the
71

Id.

72

Id. at 1260.

73 Id at 1268.
74 Id
75 Id.
76 Justice Souter

also cited to Ermere Music, Inc. v. Nat Broad Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir.
1980), affg 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), in his discussion of the need for a parody to conjure
up the original work. The Second Circuit in Elsemere also declared that "in today's world of often
unrelieved solemnity, copyright law should be hospitable to the humor of parody...." Elsmere
Music, 623 F.2d at 252-53.
77 SunTrmst, 268 F.3d at 1268.
78 Id. at 1268-69 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994)).
79 Id
80 Id at 1269.
81 Id at 1268.

s2 Id at 1269-76.
83 Id at 1269-71.
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copyrighted novel warranted a high degree of protection from copying, but that
s4
parodies inevitably comment on widely known, expressive works. Under the
third factor, the court reasoned that extraneous copying-i.e., using material
that is nonessential to "assure identification" of the copyrighted work-was
only unlawful if such copying adversely affected the market for the copyrighted
work.85 The SunTrust court was unable to determine "whether 'the quantity and
value of the materials used [were] reasonable in relation to the purpose of the
copying in terms of what was necessary to conjure up the original.' "86
Finally, the court considered the evidence of substantial harm to the market
for the copyrighted work, concerning itself only with the harm of market
substitution. 87 The plaintiffs did not present evidence regarding the likelihood
that the defendant's work would supplant demand for Gone With The Wind itself
or its derivative market, but instead presented only the value of the markets
themselves. 88 As a result, the court weighed the fourth factor in favor of the
alleged infringer.8 9 After balancing the four fair use factors, the court held that
the new work criticized and commented upon Mitchell's original novel in a
90
parodic manner, and therefore presented a viable fair use defense.
E. COURTS' APPLICATION OF FAIR USE TO DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED
VIEWPOINTS

The courts in the above-mentioned cases unraveled the application of fair
use to parody. Yet applying the fair use parody defense to antithetical
viewpoints expressed in separate works has not been as thoroughly analyzed by
the courts. The following cases provide examples of the fair use defense as
applied to works expressing polar opposite viewpoints.
Prior to the Supreme Court's parody ruling in Campbell, the Second Circuit
held in Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell that the fair use defense to copyright
infringement applied to works incorporating diametrically opposed viewpoints
91
Maxtonein the context of the pro-choice versus pro-life abortion debate.
Graham involved a book, Pregnantby Mistake by Maxtone-Graham, that included
interviews with women who discussed unwanted pregnancies and their
experiences with abortions. 92 Several years later, Burtchaell, a Catholic priest,
84 Id. at 1271.
85 Id.at 1273-74 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994)).

86 Id. at 1274 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 586).
87 Id.at 1274-75.
88 Id.at 1275-76.
89 Id.

90 Id.at 1276-77.
91 803 F.2d 1253, 1256, 1265 (2d Cir. 1986).
92 Id.at 1256.
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incorporated quotes from Pregnant by Mistake into the title essay of his book,
Rachel Weeping.93 Burtchaell claimed to include the quotes from MaxtoneGraham's book as a way to critique the accounts of the women's abortion
experiences. 94 Though Maxtone-Graham refused to authorize the use of her
work in Rachel Weeping and expressed to Burtchaell that she included the
interviews in her book to advance an understanding of the pro-choice
viewpoint, Burtchaell proceeded to include the interviews in his anti-abortion
essay to promote his polar viewpoint. 95 Burtchaell then asserted the fair use
defense in response to copyright infringement allegations.96 While the prochoice and pro-life stances are inextricably opposed, the Maxtone-Graham court
held that Burtchaell's use of the copyrighted work was fair use. 97
The court's rationale rested upon the notion that Burtchaell used material
from the interviews as a way to critique and comment upon the original pro-life
work. 98 The court analyzed the four fair use factors as follows: first, the
purpose and character of the use could be categorized as comment or
criticism, 99 and the commercial nature of the use was not dispositive of a
finding against fair use. 100 Second, the nature of the original work lent itself to
use by others.' 0' Third, the volume of the quotation was minor 02 Finally, the
effect upon the potential market was negligible because "the two works served
fundamentally different functions."' 0 3 After balancing the four factors, the
Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Burtchaell's inclusion of
the quotes as fair use.' 4
Another example of the application of fair use to diametrically opposing
viewpoints can be found in WojnarowicZ v. American Famiy Ass'n.105 Here, the
defendant, the American Family Association (AFA), distributed a pamphlet that
included copied fragments of the plaintiff's artwork. 106 Campaigning against
government funding of artwork that the AFA deemed "'offensive' and
93Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.at 1257.
96

Id.at 1255, 1265.

97 Id.at 1265.
98 Id.at 1260.

99Id

100Id.at 1261-62.
101Id.at 1262-63 ("Maxtone-Graham's book was essentially factual in nature, and... subsequent
authors may rely more heavily on such works.").
102 Id.at 1263 (discussing "the... amount and substantiality of the [use] in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole'). 103 Id at 1263-64.
104Id.at 1265.
105 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
106 Id.at 134.
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'blasphemous' ",107 was a central activity of the organization. On the other end
of the spectrum, the artist of the original work sought to convey messages
about social issues surrounding AIDS, often by incorporating sexually explicit
images in his art. 108 Upon suit for infringement by the original artist, the AFA
raised the fair use defense under the umbrella of criticism and comment, and
09
the court again applied the four fair use factors.
The original artist asserted that the AFA distorted his work to make it
appear more offensive and, in so doing, removed the criticism from the scope
of fair use protection." 0 Here, the court relied upon the Second Circuit's
rationale in Maxtone-Graham."' The WojnarowticZ court agreed with the Second
Circuit and considered
it highly undesirable to hinge a legal determination solely on the
relative truth or accuracy of statements made in the context of
debate on a highly volatile social issue .... Only where the
distortions [are] so deliberate, and so misrepresentative of the
original work that no person could find them to be the product of
mere carelessness would [the court] incline toward rejecting a fair
112
use claim.
The court determined that a reasonable person could have found that the
distortion resulted from carelessness, rather than from intent to distort the
13
artist's work.
After balancing the remaining fair use factors-the commercial purpose of
the defendant's use, the nature of the artist's work, the volume of the taking,
4
court held that,
and the market effect on the original work'' -the
the use of the
viewpoint,
notwithstanding the polar nature of the defendant's
5
defense."
use
fair
the
by
protected
and
fair
artwork in the pamphlets was

107 Id. at 133.
108 Id.
109 Id at 142-47.
110 Id. at 143.
111 Id.
112

Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.3d 1253, 1261

(2d Cir. 1986)).
113 Id. at 144.
114 Id. at 144-46.
115 Id at 147.
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F. THE JUNE 2012 NORTHLAND FAMILY PLANNING CLINIC V. CENTER FOR BIOETHICAL REFORM DECISION

In June 2012, the United States District Court for the Central District of
California reconsidered the application of the fair use factors to parodies in
Northland Family Planning Cknic, Inc. v. Centerfor Bit-Ethical Reform, a case with
facts somewhat analogous to those of Maxtone-Graam.116 The Northland court,
though not explicitly, determined that the fair use parody defense to copyright
infringement applies to diametrically opposing works. 1 7
Northlandarose from a suit brought by the Northland Family Planning Clinic
(Northland), a pro-choice abortion clinic," 8 against the Center for Bio-Ethical
Reform (CBR), an anti-abortion organization," 9 for copyright infringement
after CBR posted a video online interspersing images of aborted fetuses and
abortion procedures throughout a Northland counseling video entitled Eveyday
Good Women.' 20 Northland created its video to offer support and counseling to
women facing abortion decisions and "to de-stigmatize abortion."' 121 CBR, on
the other hand, created its video to "expose the 'fallacies' " espoused in the
Northland video regarding the effects of choosing to undergo an abortion
procedure. 22 Both parties moved for summary judgment. 23 Northland
asserted that CBR violated its exclusive right to the original video, while CBR
raised the fair use defense. 24
To determine whether CBR's use of Northland's video to support its
contrary stance was copyright infringement, the district court scrutinized the
facts under the fair use factors as set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 107 of the Copyright
Act. 25 The court applied the fair use factors in light of "the goals of the
116

See Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 868 F. Supp. 2d

962, 966-68, 982-83 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that defendant's use of a copyrighted video for
pro-life views was fair use parody).
117
118

Id. at 982-83.
See

NORTHLAND FAMILY PLANNING CENTERS,

http://www.northlandfamilyplanning.com

(last visited Sept. 21, 2013) ("As abortion care providers, we are dedicated to providing highquality reproductive health and abortion services in a respectful, nurturing and inspiring
atmosphere.").
119 THE CENTER FOR BIo-ETHICAL REFORM,

2013).

http://www.abortionno.org (last visited Sept. 21,

120 Northland, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 966-67; Eveyday Good Women, NORTHLAND FAMILY PLANNING
CENTERS, http://www.northlandfamilyplanning.com/videos/everyday-good-women/ (last visited
Sept. 21, 2013).
121 Northland, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
122 Id at 967 (quoting Pl.'s Notice of Lodging, Ex. F, Deposition of Eric Holmberg
("Holnberg Dep.") 39:1-8, 40:18-41:5, Docket No. 77).

123

Id.at 968.

124

Id.
Id at 969-70.
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Copyright Act" to determine whether CBR's video amounted to fair use under
the policy of "promot[ing] the progress of science and art by protecting artistic
and scientific works while encouraging the development and evolution of new
works. 1' 26 Ultimately, the court relied upon the accepted practice of flexibly
127
balancing the fair use factors as a way to ensure that creativity was not stifled.
Applying the first fair use factor, the purpose and character of the use, 128 the
court considered (1) whether the work was transformative, 129 and (2) whether
the work was created for a commercial purpose. 130
First, the court considered CBR's argument that the work was a parody. 31
The court acknowledged that parodies are transformative because parody
"comment[s] on the original work, and in the process, create[s] a new
[work]. '"132 Parody requires mimicry of the original work by the alleged
infringer. 133 CBR's video, the Northland court reasoned, was a parody because it
"use[d] segments of Northland's video.., to deride the original work's
message." 134 CBR's video conveyed a message that abortion is not, as
Northland communicated in its original video, a normal decision. 135
Rejecting Northland's argument, the court did not determine that CBR used
the video to debate the more general abortion theme, rather than to criticize the
particular video.3 6 CBR did not present both sides of the debate, but instead
relied only upon its pro-life stance in its derivative work.137 The court ruled that
CBR copied solely to "dispel the 'falsities' of the Northland Video," and
therefore targeted the copyrighted work.138 CBR's video would not have been a
parody if it had commented on an entirely new subject-for example, the
139
general abortion debate rather than the video itself.

126 Id. (quoting Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 799 (9th Cir. 2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
127 Id. at 970 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994)).
128 Id.

129

Id.at 970-78.

130Id.at 970, 978-79.
131 Id. at 971-72.
132 Id. at 971.
133Id.at 972.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 972-73.
137Id.
138Id.at 973 (citation omitted).
139 Id.; see also id at n.6 ("[E]ven if this Court found that the accused Videos broadly criticized
the pro-choice position in addition to the Northland Video, the analysis would be in accord with

Campbell.").
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Continuing with the first fair use factor, the court rejected Northland's
contention that the use of humor is essential to the fair use parody defense. 140
While modem definitions of parody typically include comic effect or ridicule,
the court distinguished parody in the copyright context.' 4' To defeat allegations
of copyright infringement, parody only needs to comment on or criticize
elements of the prior composition to create a new work. 142 Contemplating the
application of parody in Campbell and SunTrust, Judge Selina stated that, "for
43
purposes of copyright law, humor is not a necessary element of parody."'
Thus, the accused video satisfied a Campbell analysis because they were highly
144
critical and ridiculed the original video.
The Northlandcourt additionally held "that fair use protection is not limited
to parodies of well-known works."'145 According to this Court, allowing
relatively unknown works to be parodied fosters creativity and promotes the
underlying goals of copyright law.146
An issue of first impression arose before the Northland court given that
CBR's use of the original video consisted mainly of video splicing. 147 Though
CBR put forth minimal creativity in splicing the videos, CBR's use sufficiently
"changed and commented on" the Northland video. 48 In this instance, the
verbatim copying of the work was necessary to "capture the essence of the
[video's] message" and create a parody.149 The court held that the new video,
though very basic, was sufficiently transformative to receive consideration
50
under the fair use defense
Regarding the commercial nature of the potentially infringing use, the court
ruled that while CBR might have marginally profited from the video, the
commercial nature of the work becomes less important when the work
possesses a highly transformative nature. 151 The transformative nature of
CBR's work rendered any profits derived from the video insignificant in light of

140Id.at 973-74.

141Id.at 973.
142 Id.

143Id at 973 n.7, 974.
144 Id.

145Id.at 976.
146Id.; see sapra notes 125-27 (discussing goals of the Copyright Act and the flexible balancing

approach to effectuate these goals).
147Northland, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 976-77 ("[C]ourts have not addressed verbatim use of
copyrighted video content in the parody branch of the fair use doctrine.").
148Id at 977-78.
149 Id at 977.

150Id at 978 ('The new background soundtrack, the visuals, and the juxtaposition of the new
video clips with the original creates an entirely different impact on the viewer.").
151 Id.at 978-79 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
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its parodic use. 152 In sum, after balancing transformation and commercial gain,
3
the first factor weighed in favor of CBR.'5
Turning to the second factor, the nature of the original work, the court
noted "that creative works are 'closer to the core of intended copyright
protection' than informational and functional works." 154 Northland's video was
creative in addition to informational and functional. Thus, the second facfor
55
weighed "slightly in favor of Northland."'
The third fair use factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion used,
was thoroughly analyzed by the Northland court. 5 6 The court relied upon the
Campbell rationale that courts should consider: (1) "the persuasiveness of a
parodist's justification for the particular copying done"; and (2) "the degree to
which the parody may serve as a market substitute for the original or potentially
licensed derivatives."' 5 7 As demonstrated in Campbell, parodists are afforded
additional leeway to "take recognizable material from the original [work] in
order to convey [a parodic] message."'15 8 While CBR took between forty-eight
and fifty-three percent of the Northland video to assemble its video, the court
held that the copying was not excessive. 5 9
To determine whether CBR's use was excessive, the court considered the
following three factors: (1) "the degree of public recognition of the original
work"; (2) "the ease of conjuring up the original work"; and finally (3) "whether
the overriding purpose was to parody" or to further another purpose. 160 These
factors weighed in favor of CBR because of (1) the need to copy enough to
make the parody of the obscure video known, (2) the difficulty in conjuring up
6
a video parody, and (3) the overriding purpose of parody in CBR's new work.1 '
The court reasoned that the overriding purpose of CBR's video was to parody
the Northland video, while garnering business and commenting on the pro1 62
choice position were "incidental to [this] primary purpose.'
Lastly, the Northlandcourt considered the fourth factor, the effect of CBR's
video on the market for Northland's copyrighted material. 163 The opinion
focused on the extent to which the potentially parodying work "usurp[ed] the
152

153
154
155
156
157
158

159
160
161
162
163

Id.at 979.
Id.at 982.
Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586).
Id.
Id. at 979-82.
Id. at 979-80 (quoting Capbell 510 U.S. at 586-87) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 980 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588-89).

Id. at 980-81.

Id. (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Id. at 981.
Id.
Id. at 982 (citing Campbell,510 U.S. at 591-92).
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potential market for the original or its derivatives," relying upon the notion that
damage by way of criticism is not relevant to the market harm analysis.1 64 The
court reasoned that while Northland suffered harm through the termination of
potential licensing agreements and decreased value of its counseling video,
those harms were not protected under the Copyright Act. 165 Though CBR's
video reduced demand for the original video, the directed criticism of the CBR
video was not a market substitute because the "purposes and messages of the
166
two [were] diametrically opposite."'
The Northlandcourt weighed each of the fair use factors and determined that
CBR's use of the copyrighted material in the Northland video was fair and
67
therefore not an infringement of copyright.

III. ANALYSIS
As demonstrated in Part II, the abundance of fair use case law and the
varied application of the four 5 107 factors reaffirm Judge Learned Hand's
assertion that fair use was, and indeed still is, one of the most troublesome
aspects of copyright law.' 68 The Campbell Court attempted to resolve the
application of the fair use defense to parody by reasoning that parody suffices
as a form of criticism or comment.169 However, while stating that a parody
creates a new work in the process of parodying an original work, the Court left
70
precisely what amounts to a parody open to interpretation.1
The mandatory application of the four-factor fair use test to an alleged
parody is not open to debate.' 7' The weight and reasoning under each factor,
however, is susceptible to criticism. First, whether a potentially infringing work
truly amounts to criticism should be thoroughly considered before a fair use
determination is made. Second, diametrically opposing viewpoints should be
regarded as criticism rather than as parody under the first fair use factor. Third,
the lack of a humor requirement for the parody defense and the low standard
for what constitutes parody should be reexamined. Courts should consider the
policy concerns implicated by affording such a wide breadth to the fair use
164

Id.

165

Id

166

Id.

167 The court granted summary judgment to CBR. Id. at 982-83.
168 Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1254-55 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Dellar v.
Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)).
169 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) ("[P]arody, like other
comment or criticism, may claim fair use under § 107.").
170 Id

171Id at 577-78 ("All are to be explored and the results weighed together, in light of the
purposes of copyright.'.
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defense to copyright infringement. Finally, upon these considerations, the
Northland court should have alternatively analyzed CBR's video as fair use
criticism and comment-not as parody.
A. THE LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF CRITICISM UNDER THE FIRST FAIR USE
FACTOR

The Court in Campbell applied a case-by-case fair use analysis rather than a
bright-line rule. 17 2 However, the legislature173 and the Campbellcourt specifically
proclaimed that criticism and comment are eligible for fair use. 174 The Campbell
court liberally construed 2 Live Crew's allegedly infringing work as criticism and
comment by ruling that its lewd lyrics were critical of the original version of Oh,
Pretty Woman.' 75 The Supreme Court gave much credit to 2 Live Crew for its
critique of the song, reasoning that the lyrics criticized or commented upon the
original song by contrasting the hard times of present with the innocence of
yore. 176 Precisely how lyrics such as "Big hairy woman all that hair it ain't
legit/'Cause you look like 'Cousin It,'" commented upon or criticized the
naivet6 of an earlier time remains unclear. 177 However, the Court reasoned that
such lyrics were in fact criticism or comment in the form of parody and were
eligible for fair use protection.
The Eleventh Circuit then adopted the case-by-case application and liberal
construction of comment or criticism set forth by the Court in Campbell. The
SunTrust court broadly interpreted the potentially infringing author's sequel to
Margaret Mitchell's Gone With the Wind as criticism or comment, 17 8 focusing on
the policy concerns surrounding the free flow of criticism and commentary. 79
While the court generously reasoned that the new work was a "specific criticism
of and rejoinder to the depiction of slavery and the relationships between blacks
and whites in [Gone With the Win4,"'' 8 it did not provide a definition or any sort
of framework as to what constitutes criticism.

172 See id.
at 577 ("The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the
doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.").
173See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (highlighting criticism and comment as fair use exceptions).
174 When weighing in favor of the potentially infringing work, the Court explicitly recognized
comment and criticism as eligible for fair use when it referred to, "other types of comment and
criticism that traditionally have had a claim to fair use protection as transformative works."
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583.
175 Id
176 Id.

177 Id.; id app. B at 595-96.
178SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1268-69 (11th Cit. 2001).
179 Id.
at 1268.
180Id
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However, the opinion did provide specific examples as to how the
characters of the new work were distinguishable from the characters of the
original work, 181 and described the new work as "a critical statement that seeks
to rebut and destroy the perspective, judgments, and mythology of [Gone With
the Wina]."' 82 The court spent most of its time describing the ways in which the
works differed. On the other hand, an equally reasonable interpretation of the
new work might have been simply that the new work was a derivative work or
fan fiction of the original rather than criticism. While the work may have, in
some respect, criticized the character choice and sentiments of the original
book, the court did not entertain this "fan fiction" interpretation.
A rationale that the second author knowingly sought to criticize the work by
telling the story from a new character's point of view leaves room for future
authors of fiction to use creative works to their advantage. It seems likely that
authors will be able to avoid copyright infringement by simply adding several
new characters and retelling a nearly identical story from another perspective
without creating a truly new work.
In summary, courts prefer a finding of comment or criticism in potentially
infringing works as opposed to a finding of infringement. Such a preference
likely stems from the high regard given to criticism and comment as fair use and
the value of creative works to the public. Courts may fear that a narrow
construction of criticism would stifle creativity in new works. Courts are more
willing to assume the risk of occasionally affording fair use protection to works
that infringe, rather than to risk denying fair use protection to a non-infringing
creative work. The labeling of potentially infringing works as criticism or
comment is even more clearly demonstrated in works portraying diametrically
opposing viewpoints, as discussed below in Part III.B.
B. WHY DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS SHOULD BE LABELED AS
CRITICISM RATHER THAN PARODY

As previously demonstrated, courts may rely upon the weight given by the
Supreme Court in Campbell to the four statutory factors when contemplating the
favorable treatment parodies receive under the fair use analysis. 183 Courts
reliant upon Campbell assume that a parody is protected as a criticism of the

181 Id. at 1270-71.
182 Id. at 1270.
183

See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing the parody defense in a sequel to Gone

With the Wina).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol21/iss1/5

20

Flegal: Diametrically Opposing Viewpoints: Why Polar Opposites Should Not
2013]

DLAMETRICALLY OPPOSING VIE WOINTS

original copyrighted work. 184 For a fair use claim to survive, the potentially
infringing work must possess components of criticism, and must not be for the
185
purpose of gaining attention or avoiding the task of creating a new work.
The courts have not, however, presented a consistent framework for analyzing
whether diametrically opposing viewpoints should be scrutinized as parody or
as criticism under the fair use factors. Allowing courts broad authority to apply
and interpret diametrically opposing viewpoints as parody creates obstacles for
authors whose original works set forth viewpoints that inextricably contrast
with the opinions of subsequent "parodists."
Modern dictionaries define criticism as "the expression of disapproval of
someone or something based on perceived faults or mistakes. '186 Though the
Northland court's categorization of CBR's work as parody was suspect, the
courts in Maxtone-Grabam, Wjnarowic, and Northland correctly considered
diametrically opposing viewpoints as criticism under the fair use test.
The Maxtone-Graham court held that the potentially infringing author's use of
the original work's pro-choice interviews to support his pro-life essay amounted
to critique and comment of that original work. 187 The court reasoned that the
new work was protectable criticism and comment because it organized the
original work in such a way as to present an argument against abortion.188 The
court likely failed to detail why the work was criticism or comment because the
critical nature of the new work was self-evident. Burtchaell used the original
work of Maxtone-Graham to express his disapproval of the pro-choice
sentiments expressed in the original work. 189 Any other rationale concerning
Burtchaell's use of the excerpts would be implausible. The pro-life versus prochoice debate readily lends itself to an inference of criticism, condemnation, or
at the very least, comment.
Similarly, the court in WojnarowicZ found that the pamphlet distributed by the
defendants counted as criticism in the form of an attack on federal funding of
contemporary art. 190 It quickly considered whether or not the work was
criticism, reasoning that no one disputed the defendant's overriding purpose for
issuing its pamphlet.' 91 This was likely undisputed because the two authors so
184See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 (explaining that a parody uses "some elements of a prior
author's composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that author's
works").

185 Id. at 580-81.
186 Definiion of Ciidsm in Engish, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PREss, http://oxforddictionaries.com/
us/definition/american english/critidsm?q=cridcism (last visited Sept. 24, 2013).
187Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1265 (2d Cir. 1986).
188 Id.at 1264-65.
189 Id.at 1255.
190 Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
191Id.
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clearly stood for diametrically opposite positions.
The AFA sought to
campaign against the funding of offensive works, while the original artist sought
to create controversial and sexually suggestive works that were foreseeably
perceived as offensive to some. 192 The AFA expressed disapproval of the
original artist's sexually explicit works and the government's funding of such
art. 193 Therefore, the Wojnarowic.Z court correctly determined that the pamphlet
possessed a critical nature meriting fair use protection under the first factor, the
purpose and character of the infringing work.
C. FINDING CRITICISM RATHER THAN PARODY UNDER THE NORTHLAND
FACTS

The Northland court should have weighed in favor of CBR under the first
fair use factor by determining that the allegedly infringing work was criticism
rather than parody. If the CBR video was criticism, but not parody, the analysis
would have mirrored the rationales in Maxtone-Graham and Wojnaroicz . CBR
undoubtedly created its video for the purpose of questioning and expressing
disapproval of the messages underlying Northland's counseling video.
According to the Northland court,. CBR's video derided the original work's
message by splicing alarming clips and images of aborted fetuses with
Northland's video. 194 Though the court's determination that the CBR video fell
within the umbrella of parody was questionable, the court was undeniably
correct that the CBR video criticized Northland's original work. 195 The court
also determined that CBR's video sought to impeach the subject matter of the
original video. 196 CBR certainly intended for the new work to discredit and
comment upon Northland's video. Accordingly, the court correctly determined
that CBR sufficiently transformed the original video into a work criticizing and
commenting on the original message.
When an author uses another work with the intent to express a diametrically
opposite viewpoint, the straightforward use constitutes criticism under the first
factor of the fair use analysis. The courts in the aforementioned cases held that
the use of another work to express an opposing viewpoint is criticism under the
first fair use factor. However, a subsequent, potentially infringing work that is
critical of the original should not automatically be protected as fair use. Courts

192 Id at 133.
193

Id.

194 Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, 868 F. Supp. 2d
962, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
195Id. at 972-73.
196 Id. at 973.
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making a fair use determination must still balance all four fair use factors
97
pursuant to 5 107.
D. IMPOSING A HUMOR REQUIREMENT

Courts properly established that polar viewpoints are criticism or comment
under the first fair use factor. However, labeling diametrically opposing
viewpoints as parody overextends criticism and comment by rendering humor
unnecessary to the parody defense. As Justice Souter recognized in Campbell,
"[ilt is uncontested here that 2 Live Crew's song would be an infringement of
Acuff-Rose's rights in 'Oh, Pretty Woman,' under the Copyright Act of
98
Construing Campbell
1976... but for a finding of fair use through parody."
an overly broad
is
parody
for
humorless
protection
use
fair
support
to
opinion.
Souter's
of
Justice
interpretation
The Campbell Court expressly referenced humor several times throughout its
However, the Court left open to considerable
influential opinion. 99
interpretation whether humor is necessary for a work to qualify as parody for
fair use purposes. For example, Justice Souter initially suggested in Campbell
200
and he included a
that parody is an "ostensibly humorous" form of criticism,
201
dictionary definition describing parody as invoking "comic effect or ridicule."

The Court also cited to Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Naional Broadcasling Co., in which
the Second Circuit held that parody was protected as fair use and emphasized
that "in today's world of often unrelieved solemnity, copyright law should be
20 2
hospitable to the humor of parody."
Mere sentences after Justice Souter referenced humor, he contradictorily
regarded parody as simply a work that comments upon the originally
copyrighted material. 20 3 This latter description of parody became the relevant
2°4
Despite the broader
definition throughout the remainder of the opinion.
construction of parody referenced in the opinion, the Court's initial allusion to
an element of humor, the modern definitions of parody mentioning humor, and

M9 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); seealro Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78
(1994) (construing Congress's intent in enacting § 107).
198Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574.
199 In fact, the Court uses "humor" and "humorous" no less than seven times. See id. at 579,
588, 597, 598 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
200 Id. at 579.
201 Id. at 580 (quoting AMERIcAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1317 (3d ed. 1992))

(internal

quotation marks omitted).
202 Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam)
(emphasis added), affg 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
203 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
204 Id.at 580-84.
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the conflicting definitions set forth by Justice Souter suggest that humorless
critiques should not be construed as parody. The Campbell Court's ambiguity
with regard to the humor requirement left room for interpretation by the lower
courts.
Parody as applied to humorless works is most clearly demonstrated when a
party makes use of copyrighted materials to support a diametrically opposing
viewpoint. In Northland, for example, the court relied upon the reasoning in
Campbelland SunTrust to explicitly declare that humor is not an essential element
205
of parody.
Northland argued that CBR's video was not a parody because the video was
not a "humorous mimicr[y]" of the original work. 06 The court rejected this
argument, by opining that "Northland overstated the importance of comedy in
parody analysis." 207 The Northland court relied exclusively upon the logic of
Justice Souter in that parody creates a new work which comments on or
criticizes the original and can "imitate[] a prior work for 'comic effect or
ridicule"' without being humorous. 20 8 While the Northland court may have
unambiguously decided that humor was unnecessary, 20 9 the court refrained
from deciding whether comic effect or ridicule were crucial to parody because
210
CBR's video "undoubtedly aimed at ridiculing the Northland Video."
The ruling in Northland runs contrary to the modern definitions of parody,
which include an element of comic effect.211 CBR's video humorlessly
condemned Northland's counseling video by incorporating graphic and
disturbing images of live abortions throughout the video in an effort to wholly
contradict the underlying purpose of Northland's original work. Regardless of
whether such a disturbing video would amuse someone with a very twisted
sense of humor, a reasonable person would not in the slightest sense find
CBR's videos to provide comedic relief. The district court was free to interpret
the parody defense in such a broad manner, but this broad interpretation flies in
the face of the Copyright Act's underlying purpose. 212
The Copyright Clause exists to protect authors of an original work by
conferring upon these authors the exclusive right to their works and, in so
205 Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 868 F. Supp. 2d 962,

973-74, 973 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2012).

206 Id.at 973 (internal quotation marks omitted).
207

Id.

Id.at 973-74 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580).
Id.at 974 ("[ll]umor is not a necessary element of parody.').
Id at 974 n.7.
See Parody Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S ONLINE DICTONARY, http://www.merriatn-webs
ter.com/dictionary/parody (last visited Sept. 21, 2013) ("[A] literary or musical work in which the
style of an author or work is closely imitated for comic effect or in ridicule.').
212 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
208
209
210
211
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doing, promotes the authorship of creative works. 213 Parody is considered
highly transformative under the first fair use factor, the purpose and character
of the use, factor because parody sheds fresh light on an earlier work and
creates a new work in the process of parodying.214 As opposed to other forms
of transformative comment or criticism, parody incorporates a distinguishing
As the Campbell Court explained, "[tihe more
aspect of ridicule. 215
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other
factors ... that may weigh against a finding of fair use." 216 Thus, a finding of a
humorless parody weighs heavily in favor of the accused infringer and typically
results in a finding of fair use after balancing the four fair use factors.
Broadly interpreting parody to include humorless critiques allows authors of
purely critical and disparaging works to claim parody and receive preferential
treatment through fair use. In Northland, CBR's video might have been
traditional comment or criticism and protected fair use. CBR's video should
not have received the favorable treatment of parody and the heavy weight
attached to the transformative nature of a parody under the fair use analysis.
The lack of comedic effect in CBR's video and its strained ridicule of the
Northland video should have prevented a finding of parody and accompanying
heightened transformativeness.
In contrast to the underlying purpose of the Copyright Act, CBR's executive
director, Gregg Cunningham, disclosed that CBR is "preparing similar Fair Use
critiques of every abortion clinic video.., in the U[nited] S[tates] and... our
CBR affiliates are working on them abroad. Northland is only a pilot
project. '217 Construing Cunningham's statements, CBR plans to take advantage
of the broad application of the fair use defense to infringement and the
Northland court's liberal construction of parody in an attempt to counteract the
fundamental intentions of the Copyright Clause. By affording fair use
protection for CBR's use of Northland's video, creativity and the production of
similar counseling videos by family planning clinics across the country will likely
be stifled.
Northland's founder and her employees spent significant time and creative
effort writing the script for the Northland video, 218 which was registered with

213

214

Id; LOREN & MILLER, supra note 14, at 342.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).

216

Id. at 583.
Id. at 569.

217

Michael Rose, Judge Rules It's Fairto Appropriate Aborfion Ck'nic's Video, HUFFINGTON POST

215

(June 26, 2012, 5:16 PM) (internal quotation marks omitted), http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/
michael-rose/judge-mul es-its-fair-to-a b_1628106.html.
218 Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 868 F. Supp. 2d 962,
966 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
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the U.S. Copyright Office. 219 Accordingly, the video was the type of work that
the Constitution seeks to protect. Despite the protection afforded for the
original video, however, the court ruled that CBR's video was a parody and held
that CBR's use was a protected fair use. 220 The fair use defense stemmed from
a desire to prevent courts from rigidly applying the copyright statute in ways
that might stifle the creativity the law was designed to foster. 221 However,
creativity will likely be suppressed if persons and critics such as CBR can
continue to use minimal levels of creativity to create subsequent works and label
them parody.
The Northland court determined that the damages suffered by Northland in
the form of decreased licensing revenues were insufficient to weigh the fourth
factor against fair use. 222 However, the court did not consider the effect on the
entire market for family planning counseling videos to be a harm. The
likelihood that a fear of attack by CBR would discourage women's clinics from
creating similar works should have been addressed by the court. The threat of
non-humorous parodic videos not only harms the market through harsh
critique, but also could be construed as usurping the demand for counseling
videos. The target audience for a counseling video is likely women who are
unsure about whether to undergo an abortion procedure. Such women will
likely be as influenced by the CBR videos as the original Northland video. The
fourth factor was not as important to the overall analysis because the court
ruled that the purpose and character of the use was parody. However, if the
purpose and character of the use was merely to criticize rather than to parody,
the market effects may have played a larger role in the analysis, possibly leading
to a different outcome.
Courts may have refrained from requiring humor in parody because of the
subjective nature of humor. 223 But a humor determination would be far less
subjective in cases presenting diametrically opposing viewpoints. For example,
few people would find the essay presented in Maxtone-Graham, the pamphlet
deriding the art in Wljnaronic 6 or the depictions of abortions in Northland to be
funny. While the subjective nature of a humor determination may be a valid
concern, the dilemma simply would not be present when considering

219 Id.
220 Id. at 976, 982.

221 Id. at 970 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577).
m Id at 982.
223 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1269 n.23 (11th Cir. 2001) ("The
benefit of our approach to 'parody,' which requires no assessment of whether or not a work is
humorous, is apparent from the arguments made by the parties in this case .... Under our
approach, we may ignore... and simply bypass what would always be a wholly subjective
inquiry.").
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diametrically opposed viewpoints. Courts should analyze diametrically opposed
subject matter as criticism and comment and refrain from labeling the
subsequent works as parody. Unlike the song in Campbell or the novel in
SunTrust, the new works in Northland, Wqjnarowi% and Maxtone-Graham clearly
fall under the umbrella of criticism and comment without any attempt at
comedic effect.
The case-by-case fair use analysis and four-factor balancing test must still be
implemented. However, the courts should refrain from freely distributing the
parody label to works lacking even the slightest trace of humor, especially when
considering works presenting non-humorous content and diametrically opposed
viewpoints.
In sum, holding that humor is unnecessary to qualify as parody under the
fair use factors presents a risk that subsequent users will abuse original works
supporting diametrically opposing viewpoints. Courts remain free to determine
the transformative nature of a work. These courts should thoroughly consider
the core theory behind the Copyright Clause when determining that a work is a
parody. Ruling that a work is a parody qualifies the work for favorable
treatment under the fair use test. Liberal constructions of parody could
undermine the purpose of the Copyright Clause by discouraging authors from
creating controversial works for fear that those with opposite viewpoints could
easily "parody" the original materials.
E. HOW NORTHIL4ND SHOULD HAVE BEEN ANALYZED IN ITS ENTIRETY
UNDER A MORE STRINGENT INTERPRETATION OF THE PARODY EXCEPTION

The Northland court should have adopted the analysis structure set forth
above. This analysis would have prevented abuse of the parody defense, but
would likely have resulted in the same outcome.
224
The first fair use factor, "the purpose and character of the use," would
weigh in favor of CBR without a finding of parody. As described above, the
purpose and character of CBR's use of the Northland video was to criticize the
pro-choice stance of the family planning clinic. The court need not even delve
into an inquiry as to whether the work was a highly transformative parody
because CBR's video was so clearly criticism.
Under the first factor, the court properly ruled that the work did not
generally comment upon the abortion debate, but instead specifically set out to
225
It would be difficult to
condemn the particular video created by Northland.
argue that CBR's work was directed at the pro-choice position, resulting in a
new work that commented upon the general debate. CBR used images directly
-4

17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).

225Northland, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 972-73.
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from the counseling video, as opposed to generalized information on the issue
22 6
of abortion.
The Northlandcourt was also correct in ruling that the criticism did not need
to be directed toward a well-known work. The court reasoned that a parody of
an unknown work fosters creativity, and extended that same reasoning to
criticism.227 Critics need a way to create new works that disparage original
works, and the need for criticism does not extend only to well-known
expressions.
The court should not have allocated substantial weight to the necessity of
copying Northland's work verbatim in the absence of parody. The court ruled
that CBR's exact copying was both necessary to parody the relatively unknown
video and transformative enough to receive consideration under the fair use
defense.228 However, in the absence of parody, verbatim copying is not as
necessary. CBR could have criticized the counseling video without setting forth
the minimal creative effort necessary to splice segments into the original video.
Instead, CBR could have incorporated its own creative material along with the
shocking images.
The final consideration under the first fair use, factor is the commercial
nature of the work. Since commercial nature is less important when dealing
with parodies, the court should reconsider the significance of CBR's economic
gain in the absence of the highly transformative parodic nature. It seems
unlikely that, even after thorough consideration, the statements made by CBR's
director about his intent to parody other clinic videos and the marginal profits
experienced by CBR229 would be enough to outweigh the critical nature of the
CBR video.
The second fair use factor, the nature of the work, would be analyzed in the
same manner as the original analysis. The court acknowledged that Northland's
video was a creative work and was closer to the core of intended copyright
protection.2 30 Accordingly, the second fair use factor would weigh in favor of
Northland.
The third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion used, would
be analyzed differently if CBR's work was not considered parody. Parodists
receive more leeway to copy the original work under this factor because enough
of the original must be used to ensure the parody is understood. 231 To
determine whether CBR's copying was excessive, the court looked to three
=6 Id. at 973.
7 Id at 976.
2 Id. at 977-78.

SId at 979.
230

Id

231 Id at 980.
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factors: (1) "the degree of public recognition of the original work," (2) "the ease
of conjuring the original work," and (3) "whether the overriding purpose was to
232
parody."
The first two excessiveness factors would continue to weigh in favor of
CBR if the work were deemed criticism rather than parody. The Northland
video is not a readily recognizable work, so conjuring it up would be difficult.
However, the third factor would likely weigh in Northland's favor because the
overriding purpose of the work would be criticism rather than parody.
Unfortunately for Northland, the weight distributed to the first two
excessiveness considerations would likely be insufficient to tip the third fair use
factor in its favor considering the transformative purpose and character of the
criticism.
Finally, the fourth factor, market harm, would probably be altered if the
work were not a parody. The Northland court erred when it neglected to
determine the harm to the overall market for counseling videos and derivative
works. 233 The court focused on the extent to which CBR's video usurped the
market for the original video and determined that damage due to criticism was
234
not relevant to the market harm analysis.
However, the work may have been more of a substitute than the court
recognized. Both works were available on YouTube, 235 and they did not serve
entirely different purposes and markets since both videos would influence
women debating whether to undergo an abortion procedure. The harms to
Northland in the form of failed licensing agreements and reputational damage
may not be the type of market harm protected under fair use, 236 but the court
should not have disregarded the real ability to substitute one video for the
other. 237 The court noted that the CBR video was not a substitute since the
purposes of the works were diametrically opposite. 238 Contrary to this ruling, if
the work were criticism rather than parody, the minimal level of creativity put
forth by CBR and the easy access to both videos would weigh heavily in favor
of Northland and may have led to a determination that the videos were
substitutes despite conflicting underlying messages.
232 Id. at 980-81 (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
233 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (requiring courts to
consider the harm to the market for derivative works in addition to the harm caused to the
original work).
234 Northland, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 981-82; see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592-93 (explaining that
harm due to criticism is not a recognized harm in copyright).
235 Northland,868 F. Supp. 2d at 966-67.
236 Id. at 982.
237 Id

at 980-82.

238 Id. at 982.
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Thus, the four fair use factors would be weighted differently if the CBR
video were deemed criticism rather than parody. Despite these differences, it
remains likely that factors one and four-the critical purpose and character of
the use and the minimal market harm to the original work-would outweigh
factors two and three-the creative nature of the original work and the large
amount of material copied from the original work. The court's end result was
probably correct, but the analysis would have proceeded differently if the CBR
videos were not awarded the liberal construction of parody under the first
factor of the fair use defense.
IV. CONCLUSION

The finding that a work is parody under the first factor of the fair use
defense to copyright infringement leaves much room for interpretation. Courts
would benefit from the implementation of clearer guidelines. The court's broad
interpretation in Campbell of exactly what can be considered parody allows room
for error when courts use discretion to apply the case-by-case fair use analysis.
While bright-line rules are probably not suitable to the fair use analysis, clearer
guidelines would be beneficial.
Narrowing what constitutes parody would protect authors of original works
from potential abuse by infringers seeking to take advantage of the Supreme
Court's liberal and vague definition of parody within the scope of fair use.
Combining the broad interpretation of parody, the judicial preference to construe
potentially infringing works as criticism and comment (as seen in Campbell and
SunTrust) and a failure to set forth clear instructions for how to determine
whether a work constitutes parody or criticism and comment leaves the courts
with a highly subjective analysis. Such subjectivity is counterproductive because
courts have expressed concerns about the resulting subjectivity if humor were
relevant to the parody analysis. In actuality, the desire to avoid the subjectivity of
humor in parody has left the courts with a vague definition and more intuitive
inquiries.
Works construing diametrically opposing viewpoints, as demonstrated in
Northland, are certainly comment or criticism, but not parody, under the first fair
use factor. The author of the potentially infringing work in Northland sought to
discredit the original author's work through shocking methods of critique. The
first factor should have resulted in a finding of criticism rather than parody
because the works set forth diametrically opposing views.
However, implementing a humor requirement for a work to receive parody's
preferential treatment under the fair use analysis is key to the elimination of
abuse under the fair use framework. A court's finding that a work is parody
renders the remaining three fair use factors less significant and weighs heavily in
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135

favor of an ultimate finding of fair use. Liberally allowing parody to apply to
non-humorous works provides an unfair advantage to authors of works who
simply possess viewpoints that conflict with the views the author of the original
work sought to convey. Failing to require humor in parody is contrary to
modern definitions of parody and threatens the very theory underlying the
Copyright Clause and the fair use defense.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2013

31

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 5

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol21/iss1/5

32

